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TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: NEW UN ROLE IN IRAQ

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Amb Khalilzad met November 9 with UK national Andrew Gilmour, currently deputy director for political, peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs for SYG Ban's office. Gilmour is transferring shortly to UNAMI to work as senior political adviser to SRSG Steffan de Mistura. He sought the meeting to learn U.S. objectives for the UN in Iraq. Amb Khalilzad, noting that UNSCR 1770 had been adopted in August, said the UN needed to get moving in fulfilling its new mandate and playing a bigger role in Iraq. The mission had backing from Ban and the USG, and we expected to see practical matters such as appropriate staffing and a new workplan in place promptly. The Ambassador made clear that the UN is not/not an alternative to the USG or a means for us to disengage, but a complement to the American effort.

¶2. (C) Turning to the 1770 mandate, Amb Khalilzad urged the UN to engage the regional states, particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, noting their role in Iraq's stability could be either negative or positive. He recalled that we had previously recommended the UN consider a third deputy SRSG for regional engagement, and urged serious consideration of this proposal, as the demands would need strong diplomats engaged full-time. He welcomed the UN's role in establishing an informal secretariat to support regional engagement. In addressing the UN's mandated role in supporting national reconciliation, Amb Khalilzad also urged the UN to emphasize its third party role, "by talking to people we can't talk to" such as Ayatollah al-Sistani, Muqtadah al-Sadr, and certain Sunni Arabs. He also urged the UN to convene talks, offer bridging proposals, and share comparative expertise and experience, particularly in areas such as border resolution.

¶3. (C) Amb Khalilzad advised Gilmour that the UN needed to work "hand-in-glove" with the USG in Iraq. Raising articles critical of the USG authored by Gilmour, the Ambassador told him clearly that such views raised real concerns for us. It would simply not work if Gilmour is hostile to the U.S. enterprise in Iraq. We expect the UN to display collegiality and comradeship. Amb Khalilzad cited his positive experience with the UN in Afghanistan, and regretted that the UN in Iraq had at times acted more like "guests at a party" than colleagues seriously engaged in helping the Iraqis succeed. The Ambassador advised Gilmour that in light of this his posture in Iraq would be closely watched. In response, Gilmour explained that he and de Mistura had worked together previously in Afghanistan and elsewhere. He said he had decided to leave New York and go to Baghdad to support de Mistura in his effort to lead the expansion of the UN role, given the importance of success. Gilmour said he understood this would mean working closely with the USG. He underscored that he intended to work in support of de Mistura, and said that they expected to be working in close coordination with Amb Crocker and the U.S. mission.
Khalilzad